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Letkewicz: Stacking the Deck in Favor of Death: The Illinois Supreme Court's

STACKING THE DECK IN FAVOR OF
DEATH: THE ILLINOIS SUPREME
COURT'S MISINTERPRETATION OF
MORGAN V. ILLINOIS
CHRISTOPHER LETKEWICZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Illinois's death penalty statute provides in part that "[i]f there
is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the [aggravating] factors set forth ...exist[s], the jury shall consider
aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and
shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed."' It seems to follow, then, that if a particular statutory
aggravating factor is present, the statute's requirement for jurors
to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors allows defendants the opportunity to question potential jurors in voir dire
on whether they would automatically vote for death based on
that particular factor.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court held in People v. Hope
that in accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Morgan v. Illinois,2 a defendant is only constitutionally entitled
to ask potential jurors "whether they would automatically vote
to impose the death penalty upon a finding of guilt," and not
* J.D. Candidate at the DePaul University College of Law, May 2009; B.A.
2004, University of Notre Dame. I would like to thank Marc Stahl, Assistant
Public Defender at the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender, who
gave helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this Article. I would also like to
thank my parents, Lawrence and Julie Letkewicz, for all their love and
support.
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whether potential jurors would automatically vote for the death
3
penalty if a particular statutory aggravating factor was present.
The holding in Hope was subsequently reaffirmed in People v.
Brown,4 People v. Jackson,5 People v. Buss,6 and People v. Har-

ris.7 This Article will argue that the Illinois Supreme Court's
holding in Hope8 and its progeny should be overruled and that a
defendant is constitutionally entitled to question potential jurors
in jury selection about statutory aggravating factors. In support
of this thesis, Part II explores the history of the U.S. Supreme
Court's voir dire jurisprudence in death penalty cases, examining the cases that led up to Morgan. Part II also examines how
Illinois and other states have interpreted Morgan. Part III demonstrates that the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Morgan too narrowly. Part IV discusses the implications of requiring
trial courts to permit defendants' voir dire questioning of prospective jurors about statutory aggravating factors and discusses
some typical questioning that a trial judge should permit.
H.

BACKGROUND

In order to understand the reasoning of People v. Hope, it is
necessary to first examine the U.S. Supreme Court's voir dire
jurisprudence in death penalty cases leading up to the Morgan v.
Illinois decision. After examining the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence, this Part examines Hope and its progeny in Illinois.
Finally, this Part concludes by examining the reasoning other
state supreme courts have used to establish either a narrow or
broad view of Morgan.
3

People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (I11. 1995).

4 665 N.E.2d 1290, 1303-04 (Ill. 1996).
5 695 N.E.2d 391, 407 (I11. 1998).
6

718 N.E.2d 1, 24 (I11. 1999).

7 866 N.E.2d 162, 185 (Ill. 2007).
8

658 N.E.2d at 403-04.
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STACKING THE DECK IN FAVOR Of DEATH
A.

U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court first substantively dealt with the issue of
dismissing jurors in voir dire who express a reluctance to impose
the death penalty in Witherspoon v. Ilinois.9 Witherspoon involved an Illinois statute that allowed a prosecutor to dismiss
potential jurors for cause in voir dire when the jurors indicated
they had "conscientious scruples against capital punishment." 10
The Court held that jurors could not be dismissed "for cause
simply because they voiced general objections to the penalty or
expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction" without violating the defendant's right to an impartial jury
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment." The Court clarified, however, that its decision did not reach the issue of the
prosecutor's ability to dismiss a juror for cause who would always vote against imposing the death penalty or could not be
impartial in the guilt or innocence phase because of his views of
12
the death penalty.
Ten years later, the Court in Lockett v. Ohio upheld the dismissal of four prospective jurors who stated that they were so
against the death penalty that they could not take an oath to
follow the law.13 The Court reasoned that these prospective jurors "made it 'unmistakably clear' that they could not be trusted
to 'abide by existing law' and 'to follow conscientiously the in14
structions' of the trial judge."'
9 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
10 Id. at 512 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 743 (1959)).
11 Id. at 518, 522.
12 Id. at 522 n.21.
13 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978).
14 Id. at 596 (quoting Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 484 (1969)). The
Court in Boulden remanded the petitioner's habeas corpus proceeding to the
district court to determine whether the petitioner's death sentence was unconstitutional in light of Witherspoon because several potential jurors in the
petitioner's death penalty case were dismissed for cause for merely expressing an opinion against the death penalty. 394 U.S. at 482-85.
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In 1980, the Court concluded in Adams v. Texas that Witherspoon and it progeny established that a juror's views on capital
punishment warrants a dismissal for cause when those views either "would prevent or substantially impair" the juror's performance of his duties.15 The Court reaffirmed this standard in
Wainwright v. Witt and made clear that a defendant's right to an
impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment requires jurors "who
16
will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."
The Court further emphasized the importance of jurors' willingness to follow the law in Ross v. Oklahoma.17 In Ross, a juror
stated during voir dire that he would automatically vote for the
death penalty if he found the petitioner guilty, and the petitioner's attorney was forced to use a preemptory challenge to
dismiss him when the trial court refused to remove him for
cause.18 The Court noted, in dicta, that if the petitioner had
"preserved his right to challenge the trial court's failure to remove [the juror] for cause," and had the juror sat on the jury
that found the petitioner guilty and sentenced the petitioner to
death, a reversal of the sentence would have been required
under the Adams/Witt dismissal standard. 19
While the Court's discussion in Ross regarding the juror who
stated that he would automatically vote for the death penalty
upon a finding of guilt was merely dicta, the Court explicitly
held in Morgan v. Illinois that in accordance with the Fourteenth
Amendment, a defendant must be permitted to ask potential jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty
448 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1980) (relying on Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Boulden, 394
U.S. 478; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
16 469 U.S. 412, 415, 423-24 (1985).
15

487 U.S. 81 (1988).
Id. at 83-84.
19 Id. at 85. The Court ultimately upheld the petitioner's death sentence because the petitioner failed to show "that the jury was not impartial," or that
the trial court violated state law with regard to a defendant's use of preemptory challenges. Id. at 86, 90-91.
17

18
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upon a finding of guilt.20 The Court reasoned that a juror who

would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of
guilt would fail to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and therefore be unable to follow either jury instructions or the law.21 While the Court noted that the Constitution
"does not dictate a catechism for voir dire," it made clear that
defendants must be allowed adequate voir dire to determine if a
potential juror can follow the law.22
B.

Illinois Supreme Court's Interpretation of Morgan

A jury has potentially three tasks in a capital case in Illinois.
First, the jury must determine the defendant's guilt or innocence. Second, if the jury finds the defendant guilty, then the
jury must determine, at a separate sentencing proceeding, if the
defendant satisfies any of the aggravating factors set forth in the
Illinois Compiled Statutes. 23 Third, if the jury determines that
the defendant satisfies one of the statutory aggravating factors,
and is therefore eligible to receive the death penalty, the jury
must then weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors in the
24
case to determine if the defendant warrants the death penalty.
504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). Specifically, the Court held that it was impermissible for the trial court to prohibit the defendant from asking the following
question: "If you found Derrick Morgan guilty, would you automatically vote
to impose the death penalty no matter what the facts are?" Id. at 723.
21 Id. at 729. The statute in question required the jury to "consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and [the jury] shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines
that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of
the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death." Id. at
737 n.10 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, 9-1(g) (Supp. 1990)).
22 Id. at 729, 735-36.
23 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(g); see also Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Criminal, No. 7B.01.
24 5/9-1(g). The text of act 5, article 9-1(g) has not significantly changed
from when the U.S. Supreme Court considered Morgan v. Illinois. See 504
U.S. 719, 737 n.10 (1992). It should be noted that the trial court is "bound by
the jury's sentencing determination" even if it does not agree with the jury's
sentencing determination. 5/9-1(g). However, if the trial court does not
20

Volume 2, Number 2

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

Spring 2009

5

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

DePaul Journal for Social Ju5tice
In People v. Hope, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with
the question of whether the voir dire in a defendant's death penalty case was sufficient to find those jurors who could consider
both aggravating and mitigating factors. 25 The defendant in
Hope was allowed to ask potential jurors if "they would automatically vote for death if the defendant was found guilty," but
was prohibited from asking if they would automatically vote for
death "if they should be told that [the defendant] was eligible
26
for death because he has been convicted of another murder."
The court held that the voir dire was sufficient to root out those
jurors who were so biased that they could not follow the law as
instructed. 27 The court reasoned that Morgan "specifically directed its holding toward the end of discovering jurors for whom
'the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant.' "28 Therefore, the additional
questioning that the defendant sought fell outside of the scope
of Morgan, and the trial court acted within its discretion in denying such questioning. 29
Less than a year after its decision in Hope, the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Brown was again faced with the question of whether a trial court could prohibit defendants from
asking about specific statutory aggravating factors in voir dire. 30
agree with the jury's sentencing determination, it has to set forth, in writing,
the reasons why it disagrees with the jury. Id.
25 658 N.E.2d 391, 404 (Ill. 1995). Hope makes no reference to act 5, article
9-1(g), but rather focuses its discussion on Morgan. See Hope, 658 N.E.2d at
403-04.
26

Id. at 403. The defendant in Hope was convicted in an earlier proceeding

of murdering a police officer. Id. at 397. Thus, two murder convictions
would make the defendant death eligible. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/

9-1(b)(3) (West 1993).
27 Hope, 658 N.E.2d at 404.
28 Id. at 403-04 (quoting Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S 719, 729 (1992)).
29 Id. at 404.
30 665 N.E.2d 1290 (Ill. 1996). The defendant in this case sought to ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty if
they found that the defendant committed multiple murders and murdered a
two-year-old and a three-year-old child. Id. at 1303; see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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The court again found that a trial court is not required to allow
such voir dire questioning under Morgan.3 1 Along with relying
on the reasoning of the Hope court, the Brown court reasoned
that the trial court's questioning of potential jurors on whether
they would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt was designed to gauge a potential juror's death penalty views and did not involve "generalized questions of fairness
and impartiality."32 Thus, the voir dire in Brown was constitu33
tionally sufficient.
Despite the court's holdings in Hope and Brown, defendants
continued to challenge the inability to question potential jurors
about statutory aggravating factors in voir dire. In People v.
Jackson,34 People v. Buss, 35 and People v. Harris,36 the defend-

ants sought to ask jurors in voir dire whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty if certain statutory
aggravating factors were present. 37 Each time, the Illinois Su-

preme Court-relying on its precedent-upheld the trial courts'
decisions to bar such questioning.38
5/9-1(b)(3) (West 1996) (multiple murders); see also 720 ILL. COMP.
5/9-1(b)(7) (West 1996) ("[M]urdered individual was under 12
years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty").
31 665 N.E.2d at 1304.
32 Id. at 1303-04.
33 Id. at 1304.
34 695 N.E.2d 391, 407 (I11.
1998) (finding no error in the trial court's refusal
to ask prospective jurors whether they would automatically vote for death in
cases involving the murder of a child or where the defendant had committed
multiple murders).
35 718 N.E.2d 1, 23-24 (I11.
1999) (holding that the trial court did not err in
refusing to ask jurors in voir dire whether they would automatically vote for
death in cases involving the murder of a child).
36 866 N.E.2d 162, 184-85 (Ill. 2007) (concluding that the trial court did not
err in refusing to ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote
for death "if the 'defendant were found guilty of two murders"').
37 866 N.E.2d at 184; 718 N.E.2d at 22-23; 695 N.E.2d at 407.
38 866 N.E.2d at 185; 718 N.E.2d at 23-24; 695 N.E.2d at 407.
ANN.

STAT. ANN.
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Other States' Interpretation of Morgan

Several other state supreme courts, such as the Arizona Supreme Court, the North Carolina Supreme Court, and the Mississippi Supreme Court, have embraced Illinois's narrow view of
Morgan and have held that defendants are not constitutionally
entitled to question potential jurors about whether they would
automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt
if a particular aggravating factor is present. 39 The primary reasoning that those state supreme courts have relied on to justify
their holdings is that such questioning constitutes improper
"stake-out" questioning.40 In other words, such questioning improperly seeks to have jurors precommit to a sentencing determination.41 Consequently, Morgan has been limited and its
requirements are satisfied once prospective jurors are questioned about whether they would automatically vote for death
upon a finding of guilt.42
E.g., State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531, 541 (Ariz. 2007) (wanting to question
jurors in voir dire if they would automatically vote for death "if they found
specific aggravators"); Evans v. State, 725 So. 2d 613, 651 (Miss. 1997) (seeking to question potential jurors whether they "would vote for the death penalty when a person, previously convicted of [a] felony, is convicted of capital
murder with an underlying felony of kidnapping or sexual battery"); State v.
Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 202 (N.C. 1994) (seeking to question prospective
jurors whether they would follow the law and consider both aggravating and
mitigating factors where the defendant had been convicted of murder on
multiple occasions).
40 E.g., Smith, 159 P.3d at 541 (reasoning that "Morgan was not meant to
allow a defendant to 'ask a juror to speculate or precommit on how that juror
might vote based on any particular facts"' (quoting United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998))); Evans, 725 So. 2d at 651 (concluding that the disallowed voir dire questioning sought to "inquire as to the
juror's conclusions or the verdict they would reach"); Robinson, 451 S.E.2d at
202 (determining that the defendant's voir dire questions were an "improper
attempt to 'stake out' the jurors as to their answers to legal questions before
they are informed of legal principles applicable to their sentencing
recommendation").
39

41

See, e.g., 725 So. 2d at 651.

See, e.g., 159 P.3d at 540-41; Crawford v. State, 716 So. 2d 1028, 1042-43
(Miss. 1998); State v. Fletcher, 500 S.E.2d 668, 679 (N.C. 1998).

42
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While some state supreme courts have adopted Illinois's narrow view of Morgan, other state supreme courts, such as the
California Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme Court,
have adopted a less restrictive view of Morgan. For example, the
California Supreme Court in People v. Cash, relying in part on
Morgan, reversed a defendant's death sentence when the trial
court refused to permit the defendant to question potential jurors about whether they would automatically vote for the death
penalty if they found that the defendant killed more than one
person. 43 The court reasoned that the trial court's limitation in
voir dire created the possibility that a juror was empanelled on
the defendant's jury who automatically voted for the death penalty because of these multiple murders, and therefore, the de44
fendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated.
Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme Court held in State v. Robertson45 and State v. Maxie46 that the trial courts committed re50 P.3d 332, 340, 343 (Cal. 2002). The trial court in Cash denied the defendant's voir dire inquiry, because the multiple murders for which the defendant had been earlier convicted were not in the State's charging documents.
Id. at 340. Commission of multiple murders was considered a "special circumstance" under California law, making the defendant death-eligible. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2) (West 2001).
44 50 P.3d at 341-43. Along with relying on Morgan to reach its decision, the
court also relied in part on an earlier decision, People v. Kirkpatrick, in which
the court announced the following view:
A prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or
against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances
likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to
the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is
therefore subject to challenge for cause, whether or not the circumstance that would be determinative for that juror has been
alleged in the charging document.
43

50 P.3d at 341-43; 874 P.2d 248, 257 (Cal. 1994). This view of the Kirkpatrick
court appears to have been based not on the Morgan decision, but rather on
the Adams/Witt dismissal standard, as the court cited that standard before
announcing its view. 874 P.2d at 257 (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424 (1985)).
45 State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1994).
46 653 So. 2d 526 (La. 1995).
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versible error when they refused to dismiss jurors for cause who
stated in voir dire that they would automatically vote for the
47
death penalty based on the factual circumstances of the cases.
The court reasoned in both cases that the jurors at issue could
not be impartial and follow the law.48 In other words, the jurors
at issue had "views on capital punishment in the particular case
[that] prevented or substantially impaired them from following"
Louisiana law to consider both aggravating and mitigating cir49
cumstances before making a capital sentencing decision.
In sum, both the California and the Louisiana Supreme
Courts have adopted the view that a juror cannot be impartial if
he or she would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a
50
finding of guilt if a particular aggravating factor is present.

HI.

ANALYSIS

For the following three reasons, an Illinois defendant should
be permitted to ask jurors in voir dire whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt if a
653 So. 2d at 535-38 (juror repeatedly stated that she would automatically
vote for the death penalty if the defendant was "convicted of first degree
rape murder"); 630 So. 2d at 1282-83 (juror stated multiple times in voir dire
that he would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant was
convicted of two counts of first degree murder).
48 653 So. 2d at 537-38; 630 So. 2d at 1283. While neither Maxie or Robertson explicitly relied on Morgan in its decision, it is clear in the Louisiana
Supreme Court's later decisions that the court in Robertson at least implicitly
relied on Morgan. See State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320, 324 n.5 (La. 1996).
The court in State v. Divers noted that its decision in Robertson showed that
jurors who will "automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual
circumstances of the case before him" is "substantially impair[ed]" under the
Witt standard and that the "Morgan Court adopted the Witt standard for determining if a pro-death juror should be excused for cause." See id. (quoting
Robertson, 630 So. 2d at 1284 (La. 1994)).
49 State v. Miller, 776 So. 2d 396, 404 (La. 2000).
50 E.g., People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Cal. 2002); Robertson, 630 So.
2d at 1283. Unlike the California Supreme Court in Cash, the Louisiana Supreme Court has never explicitly recognized that a defendant has a constitutional right to question jurors about aggravating factors.
47
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particular statutory aggravating factor is present. First, such
questioning is required to protect a defendant's constitutional
right to an impartial jury. Second, the defendant's constitutional
right to an impartial sentencing jury outweighs the trial court's
interest to conduct voir dire as it sees fit. Third, questions in voir
dire concerning statutory aggravating factors are not impermissible "stake out" questions that would require jurors to precommit to a sentencing determination.
A.

Defendant's Constitutional Right to an Impartial Jury

The Illinois Supreme Court has adhered to the belief that
Morgan only requires a trial court to permit questioning that
will root out jurors who believe that aggravating and mitigating
evidence is irrelevant. 51 Consequently, the trial court can prohibit questioning that attempts to root out jurors who believe, in
certain cases, that aggravating evidence is relevant and mitigating evidence is irrelevant, and vice versa.52 However, such a
view is problematic because the Illinois death penalty statute requires jurors to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors
after determining that the defendant is death eligible. 53 And to
consider means "to think about with a degree of care or caution" or "treat in an attentive, solicitous, or kindly way." 54 Thus,
under the plain meaning of the Illinois death penalty statute,
jurors who find either aggravating or mitigating evidence to be
irrelevant are unable to follow the requirements of Illinois law
to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors. 55 Regardless of the type of capital case at issue, such as multiple murders
51

See, e.g., People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (11.

52
53

See id.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(g) (2007).

1995).

54 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED

483 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1981) [hereinafter

WEBSTER'S].

Id. See 5/9-1(g); see also Susan D. Rozelle, The Utility of Witt: Understanding the Language of Death Qualification,54 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 687 (2002)
(discussing the meaning of "consider"); The Harvard Law Review Associa55

Volume 2, Number 2

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

Spring 2oo0,

11

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4

De~aul Journal for Social Justice

228

or murder of a police officer, the Illinois death penalty statute
makes no exceptions to its requirement that jurors consider both
aggravating and mitigating evidence.56 Consequently, jurors
who, for example, consider mitigating evidence to be irrelevant
in multiple murder capital cases are just as unable to follow the
plain meaning of the Illinois death penalty statute as jurors who
consider mitigating evidence to be irrelevant in all capital
cases. 57 Indeed, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Illinois
Supreme Court have concluded that a death penalty system that
would automatically sentence a defendant to death based on a
particular aggravating factor is unconstitutional. 5s
The Morgan court recognized the importance of having jurors
who carefully think about aggravating and mitigating evidence. 59
The Court noted that due process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires jurors to consider the evidence of both aggravattion, Defendant's Right to Strike Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 106

L.

HARV.

183, 190 (1992) (discussing the definition of "consider").
56 See 5/9-1(g).
57 Id. See also Brief & Argument for Defendant-Appellant at 59-60, People
v. Harris, 866 N.E.2d 162 (Ill. 2007) (No. 98942) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant-Appellant Harris] ("[T]hose who will impose death in every case are
merely one type of individual who will not consider mitigation."); Reply
Brief & Argument for Defendant-Appellant at 8, People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d
391 (I11. 1995) (No. 75503) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant
Hope] ("The juror who would automatically vote for death upon a finding of
[death] eligibility would not consider and weigh mitigating evidence. The
danger is exactly the same as the automatic vote for death upon a
conviction.").
58 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 67, 68 n.1, 85 (1987) (striking down a
state's death penalty statute that mandated that a defendant be sentenced to
death if he commits a murder while serving a life sentence without the opportunity for parole); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 329, 330 n.3, 336 (1976)
(holding that the state's death penalty statute that required a defendant to be
sentenced to death if he committed a murder that had a particular aggravating factor such as the murder of a police officer as being a violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); People v. Young, 538 N.E.2d 461, 480
(Ill. 1989) (rejecting a defendant's argument that the Illinois death penalty
statute should be amended as to require that a defendant be sentenced to
death if the defendant satisfies one of the aggravating factors).
59 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
REV.
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ing and mitigating factors in good faith. 60 Additionally, the
Court noted that jurors who found mitigating evidence to be immaterial should be dismissed for cause. 61 While the Court was
dealing with the question of whether the defendant could ask
jurors if they would automatically vote for death upon a finding
of guilt, the crux of the Court's reasoning was that jurors must
be willing to consider mitigating evidence regardless of what the
aggravating factors may be. 62 Indeed, the "thrust of Morgan is to
identify those jurors who, because of personal convictions or
preconceived notions about the seriousness of certain types of
crimes, will not consider mitigating evidence no matter what the
evidence might be."63
The dissent in Morgan interpreted the majority's opinion as
holding that jurors who would automatically vote for death if
certain aggravating factors were present should be dismissed for
cause. The dissent argued that jurors who would state in voir
dire that they would always convict a defendant if the state
Id.
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 739.
62 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Harris, supra note 58, at 59-60; Reply
Brief for Defendant-Appellant Anton Brown Challenging His Conviction &
Sentence of Death at 8, People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290 (I11.
1996) (No.
74532) [hereinafter Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant Brown]. This
broad reading of Morgan is supported by Wainwright v. Witt. 469 U.S. 412
(1985). In Witt, the Court rejected the argument that because the prosecutor
in the case used the word "interfere" instead of "prevent," as was set forth in
the jury dismissal standard in Adams v. Texas in questioning a juror, the trial
court did not have a basis for dismissing the juror for cause. 469 U.S. at
432-34. The Court reasoned that "[r]elevant voir dire questions addressed to
this issue need not be framed exclusively in the language of the controlling
appellate opinion; the opinion is, after all, an opinion and not an intricate
device in a will." Id. at 433-34.
63 Reply Brief for Defendant-Appellant Brown, supra note 63, at 8. But see
John Holdridge, Selecting CapitalJurors Uncommonly Willing to Condemn a
Man to Die: Lower Courts' Contradictory Readings of Wainwright v. Witt
and Morgan v. Illinois, 19 Miss. C. L. REV. 283, 300 (1999) (arguing that
death penalty voir dire questioning should be limited to whether jurors can
consider the death penalty in the abstract and not whether they can consider
the death penalty based on the facts and circumstances of the case).
60
61
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proved the "elements of circumstantial evidence x, y, and z"
64
would be a lawful juror who should not be dismissed for cause.
In sum, the majority in Morgan believed that a jury could not
fulfill its constitutional mandate to be impartial and follow the
law if the jurors would refuse to give mitigating evidence any
65
weight.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recognized this constitutional
mandate for impartial jurors in State v. Robertson66 and State v.
Maxie.67 In both cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court made clear
that jurors who would refuse to give mitigating evidence any
weight because of the aggravating factors or circumstances involved in the case are unable be impartial and follow the law.68
Thus, such jurors must be dismissed for cause. 69 The fact that
jurors might consider non-death sentences in other capital cases
is irrelevant, because the jurors refuse to consider a non-death
70
sentence in the case before them.
The California Supreme Court also recognized this constitutional mandate. 71 It held that jurors' constitutional duty is to
make a sentencing determination based on "the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" and not an automatic
determination-whether it be for or against the death penaltybased on a particular circumstance.72 An essential way to determine if jurors will fulfill this constitutional duty is to be able to
question them in voir dire regarding whether they would automatically vote for the death penalty if a particular aggravating
Morgan, 504 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification" Through Expanded
Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1209, 1258 (2001).
66 State v. Robertson, 630 So. 2d 1278 (La. 1994).
67 653 So. 2d 526 (La. 1995).
68 653 So. 2d at 538; Robertson, 630 So. 2d at 1283.
69 See, e.g., 630 So. 2d at 1283.
70 Id.
71 People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Cal. 2002); People v. Kirkpatrick, 874
P.2d 248, 257 (Cal. 1994).
64
65

72

874 P.2d at 257.
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factor is present. 73 To not allow such questioning would violate a
"defendant's due process rights to an impartial jury." 74
It is important to understand the consequences of not allowing the questioning of jurors in voir dire about particular aggravating factors. The Capital Jury Project's (CJP) research is
instructive as to these consequences.7 5 In its survey of jurors
who served on capital cases, it found that over 70% of those
jurors believed that the death penalty was the only appropriate
sentence for a case involving "murder by someone previously
convicted of murder." 76 Fifty-seven percent of those jurors believed that the death penalty was the only appropriate sentence

for a case involving "a planned, premeditated murder." 77 Fiftytwo percent of those jurors believed that the death penalty was
the only appropriate punishment for a case involving "murders
in which more than one victim is killed." 78 Almost 48% of those

jurors believed that the death penalty was the only appropriate
punishment for a case involving the "killing of a police officer or
50 P.3d at 341.
Id. at 342-43.
75 The Capital Jury Project (CJP) is a large research project dedicated to
studying capital jury decision-making in fifteen different states (Alabama,
California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and
Virginia). William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions,Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476, 1486, 1488, 1488 tbl.1 (1998)
[hereinafter Bowers ForeclosedImpartiality]; William J. Bowers, The Capital
Jury Project: Rationale, Design, and Preview of Early Findings,70 IND. L.J.
1043, 1078 n.190, n.192, n.194 (1995) [hereinafter Bowers Early Findings].
The CJP selected twenty to thirty capital juries in each of the fifteen states
and then selected four jurors from each of those juries for three to four hour
personal interviews. Bowers ForeclosedImpartiality,supra, at 1486-87. The
CJP questioned the jurors about various aspects of their sentencing decisionmaking process. Id. at 1486.
76 Id. at 1504, 1505 tbl.6. CJP surveyed 892 jurors from eleven of the fifteen
states that were a part of its research project. Id. at 1487, 1505 tbl.6. Indiana,
Louisiana, New Jersey and Tennessee were excluded. Id. at 1487 n.44.
77 Id. at 1505 tbl.6. CJP surveyed 888 jurors on this question. Id.
78 Id. CJP surveyed 892 jurors on this question. Id.
73

74
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prison guard." 79 Finally, over 45% of those jurors believed that
the death penalty was the only appropriate punishment in a case
involving a "murder by a drug dealer." 80
It is important to note that these percentages are of jurors
who actually served on a capital jury.81 Presumably, these jurors

were at least questioned in the abstract about whether they
would consider aggravating and mitigating evidence and
whether they would follow the law. Despite these questions, all
of these jurors were viewed as impartial and allowed to serve on
a capital jury.82 If these jurors had served on a capital case in
83
Illinois, involving one of the factual scenarios discussed above,
the defendant would be faced with a jury in which at least half of
the jury would have already decided to vote for the death penalty, regardless of what mitigating evidence the defendant might
bring forth.8 4 Yet such a jury would be deemed impartial so long
as the defendant could ask jurors in voir dire whether they
would automatically vote for the death penalty upon a finding of
guilt.85 How the Illinois Supreme Court could deem such a jury
impartial is quite perplexing.86
79

Id. CJP surveyed 888 jurors on this question. Id.

80 Id. CJP surveyed 890 jurors on this question. Id. CJP also found that

over 21% of 883 jurors surveyed believed that death was the only appropriate sentence where an "outsider to the community kills an admired and
respected member of the community," and over 23% of 891 jurors surveyed
believed that death was the only appropriate sentence in a case involving a

"killing that occurs during another crime." Id.

81 Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 76, at 1486-87.
82 Id.
83 Each of those factual scenarios would render the defendant death-eligible
under Illinois law. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(1)-(3), (9), (11) (2007).
84 See Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 75, at 1505 tbl.6. Particu-

larly troubling are the CJP findings that the more scenarios for which jurors
believe that the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment, the more
likely that jurors will find that the death penalty is appropriate in the case

before them during the guilt phase of the trial rather than the sentencing
phase. Id. at 1507 tbl.7.
85
86

See People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (Ill. 1995).
See Blume et al., supra note 66, at 1258 (arguing that an impartial jury can

only be achieved through probative voir dire questioning extending beyond
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One argument that could be made in response to these shocking numbers is that having some jurors who would automatically
vote for the death penalty based on the statutory aggravating
factors in the case would not deny the defendant an impartial
jury because other jurors could potentially block imposing the
death penalty, as the Illinois statute requires a unanimous jury
vote for the death penalty before it can be imposed. 87 However,
such reasoning should be rejected for two reasons. First, research on capital juries has shown that whether a jury votes for
death often comes down to a few votes. 88 In the CJP's survey of
capital juries in South Carolina, researchers found that when
nine or more jurors voted for death in the first vote during sentencing deliberations, the jury returned a death sentence 100%
of the time.89 But when seven or fewer jurors voted for death on
the first vote, none of the juries returned a death sentence. 90
Thus, if a defendant is charged with a murder involving one of
the five factual scenarios discussed above, the prosecutor realistically only needs to convince three or fewer jurors to get a
death sentence because at least half of the jurors will already

whether jurors would automatically impose the death penalty upon a finding
of guilt).
87 See 5/9-1(g); Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 750 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
88 Theodore Eisenberg et al., ForecastingLife and Death: JurorRace, Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 303-04

(2001).

89 Id. at 303 tbl.7, 304. The CJP's survey sample of capital jurors consisted of
187 jurors who sat in on one of 53 randomly selected capital trials. Id. at
280-81. Twenty-eight of those cases resulted in death sentences and twentyfive resulted in life sentences. Id. at 280. While the sample was limited to
capital jurors in South Carolina, the CJP found no significant difference between South Carolina jurors and jurors in other jurisdictions in its data. Id.
at 280, 280 n.10 (citing Theodore Eisenberg et al., Jury Responsibility in Capital Sentencing: An Empirical Study, 44 BurT. L. REV. 339, 354 (1996); Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do
Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1575-76 (1998)).
90 Eisenberg et al., supra note 88, at 303 tbl.7, 304.
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vote for the death penalty automatically. 91 Consequently, allowing jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty if certain statutory aggravating factors are present makes it
significantly easier for prosecutors to secure death sentences.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that a jury is still impartial even though one juror in that jury is
not impartial.92 The Court stated in Morgan that if one juror is
empanelled who would automatically vote for death upon a
finding of guilt, and the defendant is sentenced to death, the
sentence violates the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment. 93 In other words, if one juror is unable to be impartial within the meaning of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend94
ments, then the whole jury cannot be considered impartial.
In sum, Morgan requires a trial judge to permit questioning
about statutory aggravating factors to protect a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury. 95 The CJP's survey of capital jurors makes clear that to disallow such questioning creates
the very real possibility of a defendant having jurors on his jury
who will automatically vote for the death penalty because of the
96
statutory aggravating factors involved in the case.

B. Defendant's ConstitutionalRight to an Impartial
Sentencing Jury v. Trial Court's Right to Conduct
Voir Dire as It Sees Fit
One of the primary reasons the Illinois Supreme Court has
been hesitant to require trial courts to allow questioning of jurors regarding statutory aggravating factors is that a trial court
91 See id. at 303 tbl.7; Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 75, at 1505

tbl.6. This is assuming that Illinois jurors feel as strongly about these different scenarios as jurors who participated in the CJP.
92 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
93

Id.

94 Id.
95
96

See Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1258.

See Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 75, at 1505 tbl.6.
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97
has discretion in the "conduct and scope of jury voir dire." Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that the
"trial court retains great latitude in deciding what questions
should be asked on voir dire."98 However, such latitude is not
unlimited. 99 Morgan made clear that a defendant's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights cannot be protected without adequate voir dire that will identify biased jurors.100 The Morgan
court recognized that jurors might believe that they can follow
the law, but in fact, they hold such beliefs about the death penalty that would prevent them from following the law, such as
believing that all murderers should get the death penalty.101 Social science research has revealed that jurors are very poor
predictors of their ability to follow the law given their views on
the death penalty.10 2 Because jurors are such poor predictors,
general questions about fairness and impartiality are insufficient
to protect a defendant's right to an impartial jury.103

In response, the Illinois Supreme Court has said that limiting
voir dire questioning to whether the jurors would automatically
vote for the death penalty upon a finding of guilt goes beyond
97

People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 404 (Ill. 1995).

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991).
99 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
98

100

Id.

101

Id. at 735. In fact, during the voir dire of Morgan's case, one juror stated

that he could follow the court's instructions on the law and then in response

to the very next question, stated that he would automatically vote for the
death penalty if Morgan was found guilty. Id. at 723-24 n.2, 735 n.9.
102 Ronald C. Dillehay & Marla R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt:
JurorDispositions and Death Qualification,20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 160
(1996). In their study, Dillehay and Sandys surveyed 148 former jurors in
Kentucky who had served on a felony jury trial. Id. at 154. They asked these
jurors whether their "attitude toward the death penalty [was] so strong that it
would seriously affect [them] as [jurors] and interfere with [their] ability to
perform [their] duties." Id. at 155. Nearly 90% of those jurors answered no.
Id. at 156. However, of those jurors, over 28% of them stated that "they
would always give the death penalty to a person convicted of capital murder
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 159.
103 See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735.
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general questions of fairness and impartiality, and is sufficient
for identifying unqualified jurors.04 However, such a view ignores the inflammatory nature of statutory aggravating factors. 10 5 For example, a juror might not believe that the death
penalty is the only appropriate punishment for all murders, but
might believe that the death penalty is the only appropriate punishment for child murders or multiple murders. 106 Indeed, the
CJP research reveals that many jurors feel this way.10 7 How are
defendants supposed to determine if jurors have strong prodeath penalty views about child or mass murderers if all that
defendants are allowed to ask is whether the jurors would automatically vote for death upon a finding of guilt? 108 The Illinois
Supreme Court has yet to provide a good answer.
While the trial court certainly has discretion in controlling the
voir dire questioning, that discretion cannot trump a defendant's
right to an impartial jury.109 Consequently, a trial court's discretion in voir dire in capital cases should be more limited than it
would be in a typical criminal case. 110 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court has limited a trial court's discretion in voir dire in death
People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290, 1303-04 (Ill. 1996).
Brief & Argument for Defendant-Appellant at 16-17, People v. Jackson
695 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. 1998) (No. 79243) [hereinafter Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson].
106 Id. at 16.
107 John H. Blume et al., Lessons from the Capital Jury Project, in BEYOND
REPAIR?: AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 151 tbl.1 (Stephen P. Garvey ed.,
2003) [hereinafter Blume Lessons from CJP]; Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 76, at 1505 tbl.6. For example, 14% of the South Carolina
jurors surveyed by the CJP believed that the death penalty is the "only acceptable punishment" for convicted murderers whereas 52% of the jurors
surveyed by the CJP believed that the death penalty is the only appropriate
punishment for "[m]urders in which more than one victim is killed." Blume
104

105

Lessons from CJP, supra, at 151 tbl.1; Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality, supra

note 75, at 1505 tbl.6.
108 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 16.
109 Thomas J. Eme, Note, Morgan v. Illinois: The Supreme Court Supports
the Right of a Capital Defendant to an ImpartialSentencing Jury, 24 LoY. U.
CHI.

L.J. 497, 514-15 (1993).

110 See The Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 55, at 191.
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penalty cases since Witherspoon."' To further limit a trial court's
discretion and require it to allow defendants to question jurors
about statutory aggravating factors would not be a departure
from previous U.S. Supreme Court precedents or Illinois state
court precedents. The Illinois Supreme Court and the Illinois
appellate courts have placed a number of restrictions on the Illinois trial courts' discretion in conducting voir dire. 112 For example, Illinois trial courts are required to allow voir dire
questioning on gangs,11 3 the insanity defense, 114 criminal accountability, 115 alcohol consumption or drug use, 116 proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 117 the defendant's right to remain
silent,118 the credibility of law enforcement officers1 19 and prior
criminal victimization.120
111 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
112 See generally Judge Michael P. Toomin, Jury Selection in Criminal Cases:
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431-A Journey Back to the Future and What it
Portends, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 83, 95-98 (1998) (discussing several different
topics that attorneys are allowed to ask jurors in voir dire).

People v. Jimenez, 672 N.E.2d 914, 915, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding
that a defendant must be allowed to question jurors in voir dire about the
defendant's gang affiliation when the prosecution will present evidence of his
gang affiliation).
114 People v. Stack, 493 N.E.2d 339, 344-45 (Ill. 1986) (holding that a defendant should be allowed to question prospective jurors in voir dire about
whether they will "follow the statutory law of the insanity defense").
115 People v. Davis, 447 N.E.2d 353, 360-61 (Ill. 1983) (finding no error in
the prosecutor questioning potential jurors about whether they could follow
the law of criminal accountability when the defendant did not do the actual
shooting).
116 People v. Lanter, 595 N.E.2d 210, 214 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that a
trial court cannot prohibit voir dire questioning of jurors about their "feelings
toward alcohol or drugs" when the defendant is raising the intoxication
defense).
117 People v. Zehr, 469 N.E.2d 1062, 1063-64 (Ill. 1984).
113

118 Id.

119 People v. Taylor, 601 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that
the trial court should have allowed voir dire questioning about "whether the
prospective jurors would be more likely to believe the testimony of a police
officer simply because he was a police officer").
120

People v. Oliver, 637 N.E.2d 1173, 1178-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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Indeed, to require the trial courts to allow the defendants to
question prospective jurors about statutory aggravating factors
would not greatly diminish a trial court's discretion in conducting voir dire.121 The trial court would only have to allow a
few additional questions because the scope would be limited to
the statutory aggravating factors that would be applicable to the
particular case. 122 Thus, to allow such questioning would not
greatly increase the time or length of voir dire.123
In sum, while the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
trial courts do have discretion in conducting voir dire,124 it has
also recognized that such discretion is not unlimited, especially
in capital cases. 125 Thus, a trial court's discretion in conducting
voir dire cannot supersede a defendant's right to secure an impartial jury through adequate voir dire.12 6 A trial court's desire
to retain discretion in conducting voir dire is an insufficient reason for allowing trial courts to bar voir dire questioning on statutory aggravating factors, especially when such questioning
would not consume a great deal more of the court's time.127
C.

Questioning Jurors About Aggravating Factors and
"Stake Out" Questions

The Arizona, North Carolina, and Mississippi Supreme
Courts have all upheld a trial court's denial of voir dire questioning regarding aggravating factors on the grounds that such
questioning impermissibly seeks to have jurors precommit to a
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 17.
Id. It is usually very clear what aggravating factors are applicable to the
case because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 416(c) requires that the State provide notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and all of the statutory
aggravating factors it intends to rely on at the sentencing hearing. ILL. SuP.
121
122

CT. R. 416(c).
123 Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 17.
124 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 423 (1991).
125 E.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729-30 (1992).
126 Eme, supra note 109, at 514-15.
127 See Brief for the Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 17.
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sentencing decision before they have heard all the evidence (i.e.,
"stake out" questions).128 While the Illinois Supreme Court has
not relied on such reasoning to uphold a trial court's limitation
on voir dire questioning, such reasoning should be rejected because the questions are not impermissible "stake-out" questions
1
but rather are questions designed to determine jurors' biases. 29
The U.S. Supreme Court has relied on the Adams/Witt dismissal standard to determine whether a juror should be dismissed
for cause. The standard states that a juror should be dismissed
for cause when a juror's view on capital punishment "would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."' 130 As the
Court has relied on that standard in determining if the trial
court erred in dismissing a juror who had strong anti-death pen-

alty views,131 there is no reason why such a standard should not
apply to jurors who have strong pro-death penalty views.132
Even if a State has an interest in having jurors that do not "frustrate the administration of a State's death penalty scheme," 133 a
defendant has an even more important interest in not having a
jury "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."1 34 Indeed,
the Morgan court supported such a view, noting that jurors who
would automatically vote for the death penalty must be removed for cause because such jurors would have views that
See State v. Smith, 159 P.3d 531, 541 (Ariz. 2007); Evans v. State, 725 So.
2d 613, 651 (Miss. 1997); State v. Robinson, 451 S.E.2d 196, 202 (N.C. 1994).
129 See, e.g., People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (Ill. 1995).
130 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424 (1985).
131 See, e.g., Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 415-16, 434-35.
132 See John C. Belt, Morgan v. Illinois: The Right to Balance Capital Sentencing Juries as to Their Views on the Death Sentence is Finally Granted to
Defendants, 24 N.M. L. REV. 145, 167-68 (1994).
133 Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
128

Supporting Petitioner at 5, Morgan v. Illinois 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (No. 915118) [hereinafter Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers].
134 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521 (1968); see also Brief of the
Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note 133, at 8.
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would substantially impair the performance of their duties as
jurors.

135

Thus, voir dire questions regarding statutory aggravating factors are not improper "stake out" questions but rather are questions seeking to determine whether jurors have death penalty
views that will substantially impair the performance of their duties.136 The California Supreme Court has implicitly recognized
such a view-stating that a trial court must permit voir dire
questioning regarding the "general facts of the case" to determine if jurors are able to make a sentencing determination
based on the "strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances."' 137 To allow the questioning of jurors in voir dire about
statutory aggravating factors would not be so specific as to ask
the jurors to make a predetermination on the death penalty issue because such questioning would not ask jurors to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors as they would in a sentencing
determination; instead, the questioning is only targeted at determining jurors' biases. 138 Indeed, the CJP research shows that
many allegedly impartial jurors harbor significant pro-death biases with certain general types of murder. 139 The Illinois Supreme Court essentially takes the view that a prospective juror
who believes, for example, that all perpetrators of premeditated
murders deserve the death penalty does not harbor views that
would substantially impair his duty as a juror to follow the law,
which strips the Adams/Witt dismissal standard of any practical
meaning.140
135

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992) (citing Ross v. Oklahoma,

487 U.S. 81, 85 (1988)); see also State v. Divers, 681 So. 2d 320, 324 n.5 (La.

1996).
136

137
138
139
140

See People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 257 (Cal. 1994).
See id.
See People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 341-43 (Cal. 2002).
Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 75, at 1505 tbl.6.

See Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1224 ("[A] juror who cannot set aside
her belief that a death sentence is the only appropriate sentence for certain
crimes is ...constitutionally unqualified to serve on a capital jury."). In fact,
the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on jurors' answers in voir dire about ag-
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One response to this argument is that questioning jurors
about statutory aggravating factors is no different than questioning jurors about whether they are willing to consider a particular
piece of evidence to be potentially mitigating, and courts have
repeatedly held that such questioning is improper "stake out"
questioning.141 However, there is a significant difference be-

tween questioning jurors about statutory aggravating factors and
questioning jurors about whether they are willing to consider
certain evidence to be potentially mitigating.142 In many situa-

tions, the jury has little discretion in determining whether a
given circumstance is aggravating. 143 For example, if the State
proves in the guilt phase that the defendant killed, more than

one person or killed a police officer in the line of duty, the jury
must find that both of those circumstances are aggravating factors, making the defendant death-eligible.144 In contrast to the
gravating factors to determine if a trial court erred in dismissing jurors for
cause. Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218, 2227, 2231 (2007). In Uttecht v.
Brown, the Court upheld a trial court's ruling to dismiss a juror for cause who
repeatedly stated that he would only consider the death penalty if the defendant would be released and reoffend even though the defendant in the case,
if convicted, would at a minimum, receive life without parole. Id. The Court
reasoned that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the juror
',would be substantially impaired in this case because there was no possibility
of parole." Id. at 2229.
141 See, e.g., State v. Ross, 849 A.2d 648, 683 (Conn. 2004) (holding that a
trial court could prohibit a defendant from questioning jurors in voir dire
about whether they would consider the defendant's "conduct in prison to be
mitigating"); State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300-01 (Ohio 1996) (holding
that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to question prospective
jurors about statutory mitigating factors).
142 But see Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1258-59 (arguing that trial courts
must allow defendants to question prospective jurors in voir dire about
whether they are willing to consider certain evidence to be potentially mitigating, because such questioning is designed to determine whether jurors are
"prepared as the Supreme Court has said they must: to consider giving
weight to mitigating factors").
143 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b) (2007).
144 See 5/9-1(b)(1), (3). This is assuming that the defendant was at least eighteen years of age at "the time of the commission of the offense" and is convicted of first degree murder. Id. About the only way that the jury does not
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firm rules regarding certain aggravating factors, a jury does not
have to find a defendant's psychological history or past substance abuse to be mitigating but rather must only be willing to
consider mitigating evidence on the whole. 145 Thus, asking a juror whether he would automatically vote for the death penalty if
the State proved that the defendant killed more than one person
does not require the juror to precommit to determining that
multiple murders is an aggravating factor because if the State
proves that in the guilt phase, the juror must regard it as
aggravating.146
In sum, questioning jurors about statutory aggravating factors
is not impermissible "stake-out" questioning. Rather, such questioning is designed to determine jurors' biases and whether such
biases would substantially impair their ability to perform their
duties as jurors.1 47 Such questioning differs significantly from
questioning jurors about whether they could consider certain ev148
idence to be potentially mitigating.
IV.

IMPACT

If the Illinois Supreme Court were to overturn its holding in
People v. Hope149 and its progeny, as this Article has argued,
two major questions emerge. First, what are the implications of
requiring trial courts to allow voir dire questioning about statutory aggravating factors? Second, what are some typical questions that a trial court should allow regarding statutory
aggravating factors? This Part discusses the implications of overturning Hope and its progeny and proposes some typical voir
dire questioning that a trial court should allow.
find those circumstances to be aggravating factors is if the jury engages in
jury nullification.
145 See 5/9-1(c), (g).
146 See 5/9-1(b)(3).
147

See People v. Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d 248, 257 (Cal. 1994).

148
149

But see Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1258-59.
658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (I11. 1995).
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A.

The Implications of Allowing Voir Dire Questioning
About Statutory Aggravating Factors

The most significant implication of allowing defendants to
question prospective jurors about statutory aggravating factors
is that a greater percentage of jurors on a capital jury would be
willing to do what the law requires them to do-to consider
both aggravating and mitigating evidence. 150 Jurors like those in
the CJP, who would always give the death penalty based on a
given aggravating circumstance such as a prior murder conviction, would be discovered during the voir dire process and then
dismissed for cause.151 Consequently, the prosecution would no
longer have the advantage of having a jury filled with jurors who
are automatically willing to impose the death penalty based on
the statutory aggravating factors in the case and only having to
convince a few jurors to get a death sentence. 152 At the same
time, allowing this type of questioning would not completely
frustrate Illinois prosecutors' ability to obtain death sentences.
The State of California has one of the most liberal death penalty
voir dire practices, as evidenced by its Supreme Court decisions
See 5/9-1(g).
151 Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality, supra note 76, at 1505 tbl.6. In order to
ensure juror candor, a trial court should allow for an individual, sequestered
voir dire when the defendant questions prospective jurors on statutory aggravating factors because jurors are more willing to share information about
themselves in such a setting and will not be influenced by how other potential
jurors answer the questions. Blume et al., supra note 66, at 1248-50. Of
course, the onus will partly be on the defendants to discover these jurors,
because it will be the defendants, and not the trial court, that will have the
burden to ask jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death
150

penalty based on a particular statutory aggravating factor. See, e.g., People v.

Smith, 604 N.E.2d 858, 877 (Ill. 1992) (stating that a trial court is only required to ask jurors whether they would automatically vote for the death
penalty upon a finding of guilt when the defendant requests such
questioning).
152 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 88, at 303 tbl.7; Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 75, at 1505 tbl.6; see also supra text accompanying note
91.
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in People v. Kirkpatrick153 and People v. Cash,154 yet California
juries handed down 17 death sentences in 2006.155 Thus, there is
no reason to think that Illinois prosecutors would not be able to
obtain death sentences.
A second implication of allowing voir dire questioning on
statutory aggravating factors is that the Illinois Supreme Court
would no longer be obligated to follow this confusing interpretation of Morgan-thatjurors who would automatically vote for
the death penalty upon a finding of guilt cannot be impartial,
but jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty
upon a finding of guilt and the presence of a particular statutory
aggravating factor can be impartial.156 In addition, allowing this
type of questioning reinforces one of the themes of the U.S. Supreme Court's voir dire jurisprudence in death penalty casesthat capital juries must be impartial and be able to follow the
law because jurors who refuse to consider mitigating evidence
when certain statutory aggravating factors are present should no
5
longer be serving on capital juries.1 7
Another implication of allowing this questioning is that prosecutors would be able to ask jurors in voir dire whether they
would automatically vote against the death penalty if a particular mitigating factor is present. Just as jurors who would auto153

874 P.2d 248, 256-57 (Cal. 1994) (stating that prospective jurors who

would automatically vote for or against the death penalty based on the general facts likely to be shown at trial can be dismissed for cause).
154 50 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Cal. 2002) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to question jurors in voir dire whether they
would automatically vote for death if they were informed that the defendant
had been previously convicted of murder).
155 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, Table 4, Prisonersunder the Sentence of
Death, by Region, Jurisdiction,and Race, 2005 and 2006, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2006-STATISTICAL TABLES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS
(2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/cp/2006/
tables/cp06stO4.htm. (last visited Sept. 19, 2008).
156 See, e.g., People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (I11. 1995).
157 See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29 (1992); see also Blume
et al., supra note 65, at 1258.
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matically vote for the death penalty if a particular statutory
aggravating factor is present are unable to follow the law, jurors
who would always vote against the death penalty if a particular
mitigating factor is present also would be unable to follow the
law.158
A more difficult question is whether defendants can question
prospective jurors about whether they are willing to consider
particular evidence such as substance abuse or being abused as a
child as being potentially mitigating. Some scholars have argued
that Morgan requires such questioning.'5 9 However, courts have
rejected that argument for the most part. 160 The difficulty of requiring such questioning is that the Illinois statute only requires
jurors to consider mitigating evidence on the whole, not that
they must also find certain evidence to be mitigating.161 Therefore, this line of questioning would not reveal jurors who are
unable to follow the law because jurors can still follow the law
and not consider particular evidence to be potentially mitigating. 162 In short, requiring voir dire questioning on statutory aggravating factors will not necessarily require trial courts to also
allow questioning about whether jurors are willing to consider
certain evidence to be potentially mitigating.
An additional implication of allowing voir dire questioning on
statutory aggravating factors is that a trial court's discretion in
conducting voir dire would be further limited. Indeed, this ques158 Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d at 257; see also 720

ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(g)
(2007).
159 Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1258.
160 E.g., State v. Johnson, 133 P.3d 735, 744-45 (Ariz. 2006); State v. Ross,
849 A.2d 648, 683 (Conn. 2004); State v. Wilson, 659 N.E.2d 292, 300-01

(Ohio 1996). But see Kirkpatrick, 874 P.2d at 257. However, Kirkpatrick relies on Witt and not Morgan. Id.
161 See 5/9-1(c).
162

See Wilson, 659 N.E.2d at 301. Of course, those scholars who believe that

Morgan requires such questioning, also believe that jurors who would not
consider a particular circumstance to be potentially mitigating, cannot be impartial and must be dismissed for cause. Blume et al., supra note 65, at
1258-59.
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tioning would just add to the laundry list of different topics on
which the trial court must already allow in voir dire. 163 While
requiring this type of questioning would be a change for trial
courts conducting voir dire in death penalty cases, it would not
radically change the voir dire process, especially because the
trial court would only be required to allow a few extra
questions. 164
One open question in allowing this expanded death penalty
voir dire, or "death-qualification," is whether this will affect the
conviction proneness of capital juries.165 Several studies have
found that death qualification causes juries to be more conviction prone. 166 A few theories have been given for these results.
First, requiring attorneys and the judge to spend a significant
amount of time in voir dire on the penalty phase of the trial
plants the seed in the potential jurors' minds that the defendant
is guilty. 16 7 In other words, potential jurors think that the attor163
164
165

See Toomin, supra note 112, at 95-98.

Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 17.
Courts and scholars often refer to the voir dire process in which the attorneys question jurors to determine which ones have such strong anti-death
penalty views that they must be dismissed for cause as "death qualification."
E.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1986); Claudia L. Cowan et
al., The Effects of Death Qualificationon Jurors' Predispositionsto Convict
and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 54 (1984).

Some scholars and the Illinois Supreme Court have referred to the voir dire
required by Morgan as "life qualification." E.g., People v. Hope, 658 N.E.2d
391, 403 (Ill. 1995); CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISH134 (2005). For the sake of
simplicity, this Article will use the term "death qualification" when referring
to all voir dire questioning on jurors' death penalty attitudes.
166 E.g., Cowan et al., supra note 165, at 63-65, 67-69 (finding that deathqualified jurors were more likely to vote guilty than non-death qualified jurors after watching a videotaped reenactment of a homicide case); Mike Allen et al., Impact of Juror Attitudes about the Death Penalty on Juror
Evaluations of Guilt and Punishment: A Meta-Analysis, 22 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 715, 720-22, 724 (1998) (concluding after doing a meta-analysis of
fourteen different studies that studied the relationship between death penalty
views and conviction proneness that "the more a person favors the death
penalty, the more likely that person is to vote to convict a defendant").
167 HANEY, supra note 165, at 121.
MENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SYSTEM
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neys and the judge would not ask so many questions about the
death penalty if the defendant was not guilty. 168 Second, deathqualified jurors may be "perceptually ready" to view evidence as
incriminating and view the prosecution's witnesses in a more
positive light than non-death-qualified jurors.169 This relationship between death qualification and conviction proneness is
70
certainly troubling and is in need of further study.
However, three things should be noted about the relationship
between conviction proneness and death qualification. First, it is
impossible to determine what would be an ideal conviction
rate. 7 1 Thus, it would be difficult to determine whether death
qualification is leading to innocent defendants being convicted. 172 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has already soundly
rejected the argument that death qualification is unconstitutional, even if death qualification produces more conviction
prone juries.173 Therefore, at least in the short-term, questioning
jurors about their death penalty attitudes is here to stay. Third,
to not allow attorneys to question prospective jurors about their
death penalty views would leave the voir dire process with the
same problem that has been the focus of this Article-the inability to determine if potential jurors will be impartial and follow the law.174 Consequently, the short-term focus should be on
improving the voir dire system of questioning jurors about their
168

Id.

169

Id. at 110.

This is especially true considering that most of the studies that have
looked at the death qualification and conviction proneness relationship were
done before the Morgan decision. See Allen et al., supra note 166, at 727-28
(listing the studies that were a part of their meta-analysis). It is unclear how
the requirements of Morgan have affected the conviction proneness of capital juries.
170

171 See HANEY, supra note 165, at 110.
172
173

See Rozelle, supra note 55, at 693.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986).

See Jesse Nason, Comment, Mandatory Voir Dire Questions in Capital
Cases: A Potential Solution to the Biases of Death Qualification, 10 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 211, 234-35 (2004).
174
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death penalty attitudes rather than scrapping all questioning of
jurors on those attitudes.
B.

The Type of Questioning That Should be Allowed

In determining what kind of voir dire questions should be allowed, two competing interests exist. On the one hand, a trial
court should be allowed to maintain some of its traditional discretion in controlling the voir dire process. 175 On the other hand,
a defendant must be allowed to conduct adequate questioning
that will allow him to determine whether prospective jurors will
automatically vote for the death penalty based on the statutory
aggravating factors in the case. 76 In People v. Cash, the California Supreme Court provided some guidance that should help Illinois trial courts determine the type of questioning it should
allow:
[D]eath qualification should avoid two extremes.
On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it
fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty
views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of their duties as jurors in the case
being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so
specific that it requires the prospective jurors to
prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of
the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to
177
be presented.
A trial court can use its discretion to deny voir dire questioning
that gives jurors detailed and specific facts about the case and
then asks if the jurors would automatically vote for the death
penalty based on those facts.1 78 However, a trial court cannot
See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991).
See People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Cal. 2002).
177 Id. at 342.
178 People v. Jenkins, 997 P.2d 1044, 1106-07 (Cal. 2000) (finding no error in
the trial court denying voir dire questioning of a juror where the defendant
gave a "detailed account of the facts of the case").
175
176
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use its discretion to prohibit voir dire questioning regarding a
general fact of the case such as the defendant being previously
79
convicted of murder.'
A defendant, at a minimum, should be allowed voir dire questioning that relies on the statutory language of the aggravating
factors in the Illinois death penalty statute.180 For example, in a
multiple murder case, a defendant should be allowed to ask potential jurors whether they would automatically vote for the
death penalty "if the defendant were found guilty of two
murders,"181 or, in the case involving the murder of a police officer in the line of duty, whether the jurors would automatically
vote for the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of
murdering a peace officer "in the course of performing his official duties."1 82 In contrast, a trial court could use its discretion to
prohibit a detailed fact-specific question, such as whether the
jurors would automatically vote for the death penalty if they
found that the defendant had stabbed his live-in girlfriend multiple times and then suffocated her with a pillow following an argument over drugs and money and then grabbed his two yearold and three year-old children while they were sleeping and
drowned them in a bathtub.183 Such a question would veer towards being the overly specific death-qualification questioning
that People v. Cash warned against allowing.184
The benefit of relying on the statutory language of the aggravating factors is that it will, in many instances, identify those
jurors who will not consider mitigating evidence because of the
50 P.3d at 342-43 (finding reversible error in which the trial court did not
allow the defendant to question prospective jurors about whether they would
automatically vote for the death penalty if they were told that the defendant
had been convicted of a prior murder).
180 See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Jackson, supra note 105, at 16-17.
181 Brief for Defendant-Appellant Harris, supra note 57, at 58 (quoting R.
2279); see 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(3) (2007).
182 5/9-1(b)(1).
183 See People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290, 1298-99 (Ill. 1996) (summary of
the facts of the case).
184 See People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342 (Cal. 2002).
179
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statutory aggravating factors in the case,185 and at the same time,
186 The
not allow a defendant to pre-try the case in voir dire.
downside to such an approach is that some of the statutory aggravating factors use language that an average juror will not understand. For example, a defendant is death eligible if he
murders a person under the age of 12 and "the death resulted
from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty," or if he commits a murder "in a cold, calculated,
and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan,
scheme, or design."'187 Many potential jurors lack a post-high
189
school education, 188 and most potential jurors are not lawyers.
Therefore many potential jurors will not understand, for example, the meaning of "brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty," because jurors do not receive instructions on
the law at the jury selection phase. 90
The solution to those situations where the statutory aggravating factor uses a term with a precise legal meaning' 91 is to allow
the defendant more leeway in using general facts of the case to
question prospective jurors about that aggravating factor. For
See Brief for Defendant-Appellant Harris, supra note 57, at 59; see also
The Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 55, at 191 (stating that
"[t]he art of discovering a person's true sentiments lies in the interrogator's
ability to formulate direct questions targeted at specific subjects.").
186 See 50 P.3d at 342.
187 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(b)(7), (11) (2007).
185

188

U.S.

CENSUS BUREAU,

Illinois, Population & Housing Narrative Profile,

in 2006 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2006), available at http://fact
finder.census.gov/servlet/NPTable?-bm=y&-qr-name=ACS_2006_EST_G00
_NP01&-geo-id=04000US17&-gc url=null&-dsname=&-_lang=en&-redoLog=false (noting that 44% of those twenty-five or older in Illinois have the
education level of a high school degree or less).
189 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR: BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2006
OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES (2006), http://www.bls.gov/oes/
current/oes231011.htm (stating that less than 1% of those employed in Illinois are employed as lawyers).
190 See Blume et al., supra note 65, at 1244 (discussing the difficulties potential jurors have in understanding the law).
191 See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 7B.07(6) (4th ed.

2000).
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example, if the defendant is accused of drowning his two children and, if found guilty, is death eligible due to the presence of
the statutory aggravating factor of murdering an "individual
under 12 years of age and the death resulting from exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior,"192 a defendant should be permitted

to ask jurors in voir dire whether they would automatically vote
for the death penalty if they found that the defendant had
drowned his two children. Again, such questioning would strike
a balance between the two extremes that People v. Cash warns
against. 193 But it should be kept in mind that the trial court
should retain some discretion in determining which general facts
the defendant can use when questioning jurors in voir dire about
19
statutory aggravating factors. 4
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite a clear requirement in the statute that jurors must
consider both aggravating and mitigating factors in determining
whether to impose a death sentence in a capital case, the Illinois
Supreme Court has routinely allowed trial courts to prohibit
voir dire questioning on statutory aggravating factors that would
allow the defendant to determine if prospective jurors are prepared to act as the law requires.195 The Illinois Supreme Court
has repeatedly reasoned that Morgan only requires trial judges
to allow questioning on whether jurors would automatically vote
to impose the death penalty upon a finding of guilt-no more,
no less.196 However, such a view is problematic.
See People v. Brown, 665 N.E.2d 1290, 1298-99, 1310 (I11.
1996) (finding
that the defendant was death eligible after he was convicted of drowning his
two children (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. 1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(7))).
192

See People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342 (Cal. 2002).
194 See Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 424 (1991).
195 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(g) (2007); see, e.g., People v. Hope, 659
N.E.2d 391, 403-04 (I11.
1995).
196 E.g., Hope, 658 N.E.2d at 403-04.
193
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Morgan establishes that impartial jurors must be able to consider both aggravating and mitigating evidence as instructed by
the court, and defendants must be allowed adequate voir dire to
determine if prospective jurors can follow the court's instructions.197 Indeed, it is clear, based on the findings of the CJP, that
asking jurors whether they would automatically vote for the
death penalty upon a finding of guilt is inadequate in determining whether potential jurors are capable of following the law
1 98
and considering both aggravating and mitigating factors.
While trial courts certainly have discretion in how voir dire is
conducted, such discretion does not have priority over defendants' due process rights to an impartial jury.199 Questioning jurors in voir dire about statutory aggravating factors is not an
attempt to seek a precommitment to a sentencing decision from
prospective jurors. Rather, it is aimed toward finding those jurors who, because of the statutory aggravating factors in the
case, cannot be impartial and consider both death and non2°
death sentences. 0
By allowing just a few more questions, the Illinois Supreme
Court can ensure that the Illinois death penalty statute means
what it says-that jurors must consider both aggravating and
mitigating factors when considering imposing death. This would
greatly improve the due process rights of capital defendants, and
with defendants' lives hanging in the balance, is that such a burdensome requirement?

197 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729, 735-36 (1992).
198

See Bowers Foreclosed Impartiality,supra note 75, at 1505 tbl.6.

199 See Eme, supra note 109, at 514-15.
200 See People v. Cash, 50 P.3d 332, 342 (Cal. 2002).
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